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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ROBERTS COURT AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH* AND APRIL SANFORD**
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Joe D’Ambrosio
became the 140th person in the United States to be exonerated and released
from death row since 1973 when state and federal courts barred his reprosecution in January 2012.1 Because of court decisions castigating
prosecutors for concealing evidence that could have led to his acquittal at trial,
D’Ambrosio was released in 2010 after spending twenty-one years on death
row.2 Yet, he had to wait until 2012 for federal appellate courts to finally reject
prosecutors’ efforts to retry him for a 1988 murder.3 As with the cases of other
exonerated individuals released from prison,4 the media coverage of the
D’Ambrosio case served as yet another reminder of the regularity with which
errors in the justice process send innocent people to prison for murder or other
lesser charges.5

* Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard University, 1980;
M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984 ; Ph.D., University
of Connecticut, 1988.
** Social Worker, Detroit Police Department. B.A., Michigan State University, 2005; M.A.,
Arizona State University, 2008; M.S.W., University of Illinois-Chicago, 2010.
Note: The views expressed in this article represent those of the authors and not their employing
organizations.
1. Innocence Cases: 2004-Present, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpen
altyinfo.org/innocence-cases-2004-present#142 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
2. Peter Krouse, Joe D’Ambrosio, Once on Death Row on Murder Charge, Now Free After
Judge Dismisses All Charges, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 6, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://blog.
cleveland.com/metro/2010/03/d.html.
3. Pat Galbincea, U.S. Supreme Court Closes Case Against Joe D’Ambrosio for Murder,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2012, 8:08 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2012/01/
us_supreme_court_closes_23-yea.html.
4. See, e.g., Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and
Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
11/25/us/25dna.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (overview description of post-release experiences of
more than 200 innocent people released from prison through DNA testing from 1989 to 2007).
5. Scholars estimate that erroneous convictions do not arise in the rare individual case, but
constitute a regularly-occurring percentage of the cases processed in the system. See Marvin
Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1465, 1519
307
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Wrongful convictions can be produced through a myriad of causes, from
“the presentation of false, mistaken, or misleading evidence to juries”6 to
“confused jurors, overzealous prosecutors, and incompetent defense counsel,”7
and, thus, there is no simple cure for the problem. Yet, as stated by Andrew
Siegel, “the nature of these problems and their frequency can be dramatically
affected by the rules, incentives, norms, and directions impressed upon the
individuals who serve as rotating parts in the criminal justice machine.”8 As a
result, Siegel’s observation points to the potential for the U.S. Supreme Court
to help reduce the problem of erroneous convictions through its role as an
authoritative, rule-making institution that can affect incentives, norms, and
directives as a result of its interpretations of the U.S. Constitution and relevant
statutes.9
The Supreme Court defines rules that affect the reliability of decisions in
criminal cases.10 Some of these rules diminish risks of erroneous convictions.11
Other rules, unfortunately, serve to exacerbate those risks and contribute to
unjust outcomes.12 This article will examine the Roberts Court and what it has
done, failed to do, or could do to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions.
There is no claim here that the Supreme Court can ensure that decisions in
criminal cases are accurate, reliable, and free from the risk of error.13 Many
discretionary decisions by victims, witnesses, police, prosecutors, judges, and
jurors are simply beyond the control of the Supreme Court and its rule-making

(2010) (“If, as noted earlier, factually innocent defendants are convicted in 0.5 percent to 1
percent of all felony convictions in the United States, this indicates a flawed system.”).
6. Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third
Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219,
1224 (2005).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
367–71 (4th ed. 1993) (describing the important impact of Supreme Court decisions on law
enforcement rules and practices).
10. For example, by enabling states to require that appellants accept representation by
counsel in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the Supreme Court sought to ensure that
appellate courts’ decisions benefit from the expert preparation and professional presentation of
attorneys rather than the uncertain offerings of pro se litigants. 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding defendants are entitled to
presence of counsel at any post-indictment, identification lineup).
12. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (finding no violation of due
process when police fail to preserve evidence unless defendant can prove that police acted in bad
faith in destroying or failing to preserve evidence).
13. The Supreme Court has a limited ability to make sure that its rules are followed. See
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 209–39 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the myriad ways
that officials in government and the justice system can resist, misunderstand, or disobey decisions
by the Supreme Court).
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authority.14 However, the Supreme Court can and should do more to protect
against erroneous convictions.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND ATTITUDES ABOUT INJUSTICE
The Roberts Court era began with the appointment of Chief Justice John
Roberts in 2005 to replace the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist.15 Chief
Justice Roberts’ voting patterns are similar to those of Rehnquist, the justice
for whom Roberts had worked as a law clerk soon after graduating from law
school.16 Since the appointment of Roberts, there have been three additional
newcomers appointed to the Court.17 The Rehnquist Court era saw deep
divisions among the justices on many issues.18 These divisions continued into
the Roberts Court era as newly-appointed Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan were similar to their predecessors, Justices David Souter and John Paul
Stevens, respectively, and, thus, their appointments did not change the balance
of views on the Court.19 The Roberts Court is regarded as having shifted
rightward through the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to replace his more
moderate predecessor, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.20 In addition, there are
clues that Chief Justice Roberts may actually be more conservative than Chief

14. For example, discretionary decisions by prosecutors about what charges to pursue and
what sentence to recommend are not dictated by the Supreme Court. Similarly, jurors’
discretionary decisions about whether evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt are matters of judgment that are not dictated by Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: CONFIRMATION
VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 85–88 (2000) (describing how discretionary
decisions by prosecutors and jurors determine outcomes in capital cases).
15. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/politics/politicsspe
cial1/30confirm.html?pagewanted=all.
16. Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July
24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?pagewanted=all.
17. The new appointees were Samuel Alito in 2006, Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Elena
Kagan in 2010. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives Approval,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/politics/politicsspecial1/01con
firm.html; Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Sworn In as New Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/us/politics/09sotomayor.html; Peter Baker, Kagan is Sworn
In as Fourth Woman, and 112th Justice, on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08kagan.html?gwh=04D1864E437CF3937E6FF4B6B21
DBFC0.
18. The Supreme Court’s divisions were illuminated by a notable percentage of 5-to-4
decisions in criminal justice cases. Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal
Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 170 (2003).
19. See Lipak, supra note 16 (“But not one of those replacements seems likely to affect the
fundamental ideological alignment of the [C]ourt. . . . Justices Souter and Stevens, both liberals,
have been . . . succeeded by liberals.”).
20. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist, and, thus, may contribute in his own way to a rightward
shift in specific cases.21 However, even if Justices Roberts and Alito are more
conservative than their immediate predecessors,22 these differences do not
significantly alter the overall division of conservative and liberal viewpoints on
the Court, with the conservatives regarded as having a five-member majority.23
Although the Roberts Court appears to be a continuation of the Rehnquist
Court, when looking solely at the liberal-conservative division among the
justices, questions remain about how these justices will address the range of
issues presented to the Court.24
The Roberts Court’s decisions affecting erroneous convictions will be
affected by the individual justices’ attitudes25 and their conceptions of their
roles and responsibilities.26 Many justices’ attitudes and role conceptions
become clear as they articulate their views in judicial opinions over their years
of service on the bench.27 Other justices may not clearly define themselves as
their positions seem to change depending on the issue facing the Court.28

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2012, at A1 (“It was also not unusual that two-thirds of those decisions divided along ideological
lines, with Justice Kennedy joining either the [C]ourt’s four more liberal members (Justices
Kagan, Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor) or its four more
conservative ones (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Clarence Thomas). . . .
Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative, . . .vote[d] with the conservatives at least 60 percent of
the time in such ideologically divided cases” in all but two terms since 2000).
24. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Rookies on Bench may Recast Liberal Wing: ‘Dynamic’ Duo of
Kagan and Sotomayor are Adding a Forceful Style of One-Upmanship and Vigor to Supreme
Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2011, at 9A (“It is not clear whether the forcefulness of Kagan and
Sotomayor during oral arguments eventually will produce more liberal decisions.”), available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20110304/courtarguments04_st.art.htm.
25. Social scientists who study judicial decision making regard the attitudes of individual
Supreme Court justices as key drivers of their decisions. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ADDITIONAL MODEL 64–73 (1993).
26. One important influence over judicial officers’ decisions is their conception of their roles
and responsibilities according to their beliefs about what judges should and should not do. See
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 209–10 (2d ed. 1997).
27. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas’ opinions in his twenty-year career on the
Supreme Court have clearly revealed that he is the justice least likely to recognize the existence
of constitutional rights for incarcerated offenders, and he does not believe that judges have an
important role in ensuring that humane conditions exist in prisons. See Christopher E. Smith,
Rights Behind Bars: The Distinctive Viewpoint of Justice Clarence Thomas, 88 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 829, 838–50 (2011).
28. Justice Anthony Kennedy, for example, is a justice who is frequently described as not
clearly defined because “he frequently winds up in the middle, looking for that elusive
compromise position that will resolve the most divisive either-or cases.” JAN CRAWFORD
GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 182 (2007).
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Because the Roberts Court has so many relatively recent appointees,29 a
number of its members are yet to define themselves clearly with respect to
issues related to erroneous convictions. There are arguably two polar
perspectives30 regarding judicial roles and responsibilities affecting erroneous
convictions. Each attitude was represented on the Court during the Rehnquist
era, but it remains to be seen whether and how these attitudes will affect
majority decisions in the Roberts Court era.
A.

Skepticism About the Judicial Responsibility for Error Correction

The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist concisely summarized his
attitude about the judicial responsibility for correcting errors when he said:
“The Supreme Court of the United States should be reserved . . . for important
and disputed questions of law, not for individual injustices that might be
corrected, and should be corrected, in other courts.”31 One unfortunate
implication from Rehnquist’s statement is that he would not necessarily act to
correct injustices that should have been corrected elsewhere,32 even though
cases reach the Supreme Court only after exhausting opportunities for
consideration—and correction—by lower courts.33 In writing the majority
opinion in Herrera v. Collins34 concerning a request in the habeas corpus
process for consideration of newly-discovered evidence of innocence,
Rehnquist emphasized “the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of
actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the
enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence

29. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
30. The characterization of perspectives as “polar” indicates “that these Justices are least
likely to agree, not that they always reach consistently opposing conclusions.” Christopher E.
Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 481
(2009).
31. Interview of William H. Rehnquist in This Honorable Court (PBS television broadcast
Sept. 12, 1989), quoted in Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court’s
Activism and the Risk of Injustice 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 66 n.63 (1993).
32. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1992) (Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion turning aside a request for consideration of newly-discovered evidence of
innocence, in part, because he described executive clemency as the final avenue for the correction
of erroneous convictions).
33. Typically, the Supreme Court can only review a state court conviction after it has
received a final judgment from the highest level of state court in which a decision could be had.
See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 18 (1964) (describing the famous case of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the Supreme Court nationalized the
requirement of a right to appointed counsel for indigents facing serious criminal charges, and the
indigent offender was required to pursue his case through the Florida court system before he
could petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear his case).
34. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 392.
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would place on the States.”35 Moreover, Rehnquist emphasized that executive
clemency is the primary final avenue for correction of erroneous convictions.36
He did not, however, acknowledge that governors seeking re-election or
aspiring to different electoral offices may, without any regard for the actual
evidence of innocence, avoid issuing pardons for fear that political opponents
will use such actions against them in a subsequent election.37 Thus, a judicial
role orientation of leaving error correction responsibilities to other decisionmakers creates risks that wrongful convictions will go unremedied.38
On the Roberts Court, Justice Antonin Scalia is the most outspoken
opponent of judicial intervention to correct erroneous trial outcomes. Justice
Scalia points to the text of the Constitution to deny the existence of any
guarantee that defendants are entitled to have an appeals court correct an
erroneous guilty verdict based on new evidence: “There is no basis in text,
tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in
the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered
evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.”39 Justice Scalia is
quite emphatic in his assertion that there is no constitutional right to be free
from punishment, including execution, merely because the defendant is
actually innocent:
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to
convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent. Quite to the contrary, we
have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable
doubt that any claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is constitutionally
40
cognizable.

35. Id. at 417.
36. Id. at 415.
37. For example, when Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia merely commuted the death
sentence, but did not pardon Earl Washington in 1994 after DNA tests excluded Washington as
the rapist in a rape-murder case, the law professor who represented Washington observed, “[i]t is
a plausible speculation that Wilder’s decision was influenced by his contemplation of a run for
the U.S. Senate.” Eric Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1100
n.91 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Melanie Eversley & Larry Copeland, Georgia Proceeds with Troy Davis
Execution, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2011, at 3A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/story/2011-09-21/troy-davis-georgia-execution/50491648/1; Michael King, Timeline
of Troy Davis Case, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/nation/story/2011-09-21/troy-davis-timeline/50498302/1 (describing the grave risk that an
innocent man was executed after a lack of judicial intervention and denial of a pardon in a case
when a man was convicted solely on the testimony of witnesses, several of whom later recanted
their testimony and claimed that the police coerced them into implicating the defendant).
39. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427–28 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. Justice Scalia explained his position in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in In re
Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Scalia shares Rehnquist’s belief that judicial officers need not take
action because judicial officers can expect the exercise of executive clemency
when there is strong evidence of innocence,41 notwithstanding real-world
examples to the contrary.42
A component of this perspective seems to be a fatalistic view about the
prospects of diminishing errors and unfair treatment, as if to say “the system
can never be perfect, so why bother trying to improve it?”43 Such an attitude
seemed to be implicit in Scalia’s comment in Herrera v. Collins that,
I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present
Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice,
much less the execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no
44
avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed adequate.

It is possible that this attitude reflects prioritizing of values that simply does
not place correction of injustice at the top of the list. Although Scalia is not
credited with the most outrageous judicial statements placing the highest value
on finality over other priorities,45 it is possible that Scalia’s disinclination for
41. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is improbable that evidence of
innocence as convincing as today’s opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon.”).
42. See Eversley & Copeland, supra note 38. See also David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did
Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42, 61–62 (noting that the
Texas Board of Pardons and Parole ignored an expert’s report concluding that the original arson
investigation had reached erroneous conclusions).
43. For example, in a memo circulated among the justices during their deliberations
concerning McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), Scalia forthrightly declared that he
considered racial discrimination in the criminal justice process to be ever-present and
unstoppable, and he subsequently voted to endorse the operation of the capital punishment system
in Georgia despite recognizing that there was strong statistical evidence demonstrating the
existence of discrimination. In Scalia’s words in the memo, “it is my view that the unconscious
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and
(hence) prosecutorial [ones] is real, acknowledged by the [cases] of the court and ineradicable.”
Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia’s Influence on Criminal Justice, 34 U.
TOL. L. REV. 535, 549–50 (2003). As described by Professor Dennis Dorin, Scalia “trivialize[ed]
[racist practices] by saying, in a single-paragraph memo, that they were merely an unavoidable
and legally unassailable, part of life for African-Americans.” Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the
Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies From the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s
McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1077 (1994).
44. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. For example, Judge Sharon Keller on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said, with
respect to post-conviction DNA test results that excluded a prisoner as the rapist in a rape-murder
for which he had been convicted, “We can’t give new trials to everyone who establishes, after
conviction, that they might be innocent. . . . We would have no finality in the criminal justice
system, and finality is important.” Gretel C. Kovach, A Texas Judge, Accused of Misconduct,
Draws Mixed Opinions on Her Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at A14. State attorneys
general have made similar arguments when asserting that there is no constitutional rights
violation if a state executes an innocent person who has been convicted of murder in a fair-butinaccurate trial. See Lisa Falkenberg, Innocent on Death Row? Texas Might Listen, HOUSTON
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concern about correcting injustices reflects an emphasis on finality in criminal
cases. Such priorities have been detected by analysts, such as in Schriro v.
Summerlin,46 when it was observed that “Justice Scalia's majority opinion
privileges finality over justice and makes a virtue out of federal deference to
unconstitutional state court decisions and laws.”47 Obviously, attitudes and
priorities favoring finality over accuracy as well as acceptance of mistakes in
criminal cases can lead justices to refrain from examining cases closely and
seeking to remedy errors. A major question for the Roberts Court is the extent
to which other justices share the attitudes articulated by Rehnquist and
Scalia.48
B.

An Emphasis on Careful Review and Error Correction

As with the issue of how many Roberts Court justices are skeptical of
judicial responsibility for error correction, the same question exists with
respect to the opposing polar perspective: an emphasis on careful review and
error correction.49 During the Rehnquist Court era and the first years of the
Roberts era, Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in 2010,50 stood out as the
strongest advocate of procedural rights to reduce the risk of erroneous
convictions,51 including careful post-conviction reviews.52 For example,
Stevens argued that the Supreme Court’s rules on death-qualified jurors
created pro-prosecution and pro-capital punishment bias in capital trials, two

CHRON. (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/falkenberg/article/Innocent-on-death-rowTexas-might-listen-1733387.php.
46. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2002).
47. Marc E. Johnson, Everything Old Is New Again: Justice Scalia’s Activist Originalism in
Schriro v. Summerlin, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763, 763 (2005).
48. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito generally do not support claims by criminal
defendants and convicted offenders. However, they have not been on the Court long enough to
draw firm conclusions about the attitudes underlying their decisions related to erroneous
conviction cases. Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Term, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 232 (2010-2011).
49. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan are relatively supportive of claims by defendants
and convicted offenders, but they have not been on the Court long enough to draw firm
conclusions about the attitudes underlying their decisions related to erroneous conviction cases.
Id.
50. Joan Biskupic, Obama’s court choice: Consensus or clash?, USA TODAY, Apr. 12,
2010, at 5A.
51. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in Criminal
Justice Cases, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 736–39 (2006) (noting that Justice Stevens was the
foremost advocate of the adversarial process, the right to counsel, and the right to trial by jury).
52. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 83, 102–06 (2007) (Justice Stevens became the lone justice to
always dissent from Supreme Court imposed prohibitions on filing petitions by prisoners who
frequently sought to litigate cases pro se).
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elements that might enhance the risk of improper convictions and sentences.53
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Stevens complained that the voir
dire processes in capital jury trials are conducted in a manner so that “jurors
are likely to assume that their primary task is to determine the penalty for the
presumptively guilty defendant.”54 Stevens also wrote the leading dissenting
opinion asserting that there should be a constitutional right for convicted
offenders to have DNA tests conducted on evidence that has been preserved in
criminal cases.55 In another example, he also wrote the leading dissenting
opinion arguing that death row inmates should be entitled to a right to counsel
for the preparation of habeas corpus petitions.56
In light of Justice Stevens’ retirement,57 who, if anyone, will emerge as the
leading voice for careful review of cases to protect against erroneous
convictions? Justice Sonia Sotomayor is an intriguing possibility as she
“provided a clue that she may emerge as the Court’s new outspoken leader
who defends prisoners’ rights.”58 She wrote a strong, solo dissent from a denial
of certiorari in a case concerning a prisoner who was punished because he
stopped taking his AIDS medication.59 Although prisoners’ rights cases do not
raise exactly the same issues as cases concerning erroneous convictions,60
Sotomayor’s assertiveness in this prisoner’s case may indicate that she
possesses the empathy and sensitivity to injustice that President Obama
declared he was seeking in a Supreme Court justice when he selected her for
nomination.61

53. Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 205, 247–49 (2010).
54. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall
Awards Dinner (Aug. 6, 2005), quoted in Smith, supra note 53, at 247–48.
55. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 87–88
(2009).
56. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 15, 20, 29 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Biskupic, supra note 50, at 5A.
58. Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L.
REV. 853, 880 (2011).
59. Pitre v. Cain, 354 Fed. Appx. 142 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 8 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
60. Prisoners’ rights cases may raise a variety of issues from the Bill of Rights, including
First Amendment protections for free exercise of religion and Eighth Amendment protections
against cruel and unusual punishments. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
PRISONERS 99–116, 121–56 (9th ed. 2010). However, erroneous conviction cases often focus on
new, post-conviction evidence and issues concerning fair judicial processes. See, e.g., Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393, 398, 400, 404–05 (1993) (assertion of actual innocence based on
newly discovered evidence is not grounds for federal habeas corpus relief).
61. Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 263, 263–65 (2010).
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The ultimate impact of the Roberts Court on issues related to erroneous
convictions will depend on whether the skeptical perspective emphasizing
finality, as illustrated by Justice Scalia, continues to hold the upper-hand when
the nine justices vote on cases.62 The continuation of current trends in the
Court’s decisions will be affected by retirements and new appointees63 as well
as by the changing dynamics of open-mindedness, assertiveness, and
persuasiveness within the justices’ interactions and deliberations.64
III. THE ROBERTS COURT: DECISIONS MADE AND DECISIONS NEEDED
It is important to examine judicial decisions in order to evaluate the
Roberts Court’s performance—and potential—in addressing issues of
erroneous convictions. Specific Roberts Court decisions have been
characterized as “nail[s] in the coffin the Court has been constructing for the
theoretically ‘innocent.’”65 The Court should reconsider these decisions in
order to fulfill its proper responsibilities for encouraging accurate judicial
outcomes. In addition, decisions during previous Court eras should be changed
in order to reduce current impediments to identifying and remedying erroneous
criminal convictions.66
A.

Roberts Court Errors In Need of Correction

Professor Janet Hoeffel has described District Attorney’s Office of the
Third Judicial District v. Osborne67 as the Roberts Court’s missed
“opportunity to do the right thing” with respect to one aspect of erroneous
convictions.68 Osborne was sentenced to serve more than twenty years in
prison upon conviction for kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault.69 In postconviction proceedings, Osborne claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and

62. For example, the pro-government outcome favored by the skeptical perspective was
supported by the five conservative justices (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) in
recent cases related to erroneous convictions such as Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 54, 61–62 (2009) and Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1355 (2011).
63. See Smith, supra note 58, at 856–81 (including a discussion of specific changes in the
Supreme Court’s composition and the potential impact on corrections law).
64. See Biskupic, supra note 24.
65. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Roberts Court’s Failed Innocence Project, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
43, 43 (2010).
66. See, e.g., Smith & Jones, supra note 31, at 76 (“[T]hese conservative[e] [justices] have
shown greater concern for improving efficiency than for achieving justice: the new procedural
rules governing habeas corpus increase the risk that innocent men and women will [be executed]
for crimes they did not commit.”).
67. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 52.
68. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 43.
69. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 59.
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sought to have more discriminating DNA testing applied to evidence from the
crime scene than the particular scientific test that was actually applied.70
Alaska denied his request to conduct the DNA tests so Osborne pursued
litigation to gain access to the evidence for which he would pay the financial
costs for DNA testing.71 Writing for the five-member majority, Chief Justice
Roberts rejected the assertion that there is a constitutional right to conduct
post-conviction DNA tests as part of the right to due process.72 In part, Roberts
relied on his conclusion that legislatures should sort out the conditions and
circumstances for post-conviction testing of evidence and that judges should
exercise judicial restraint in refraining from identifying a new constitutional
right.73 Roberts expressed fears about detrimental impacts on the criminal
justice system: “The dilemma is how to harness DNA’s power to prove
innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of
criminal justice.”74 As Professor Hoeffel observed, however, “Chief Justice
Roberts did not elaborate on how such a disaster would come to pass.
Recognition of the due process claim requested by Osborne would affect [only]
a small number of cases. Such an opening could only enhance the public's
sense that justice was done.”75 Thus, Roberts’ expressed fears of harm to the
system appear to be exaggerated and, even if true, should not automatically
outweigh the goal of ensuring that innocent people are not erroneously locked
away in prison.
On behalf of the four dissenters, Justice Stevens emphasized the
importance of both the damage to individual liberty from erroneous conviction
and the government’s own interest in making sure that the correct individual
has been punished:
In sum, an individual’s interest in his physical liberty is one of constitutional
significance. That interest would be vindicated by providing postconviction
access to DNA evidence, as would the State’s interest in ensuring that it
punishes the true perpetrator of a crime. In this case, the State has suggested no
countervailing interest that justifies its refusal to allow Osborne to test the
evidence in its possession and has not provided any other nonarbitrary
explanation for its conduct. Consequently, I am left to conclude that the State’s
failure to provide Osborne access to the evidence constitutes arbitrary action
76
that offends basic principles of due process.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 58–60.
72. Id. at 72–74.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 62.
75. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 56.
76. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 100 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the dominant perspective of skepticism turned aside an opportunity to
recognize that avoidance of wrongful convictions should be a central concern
of the justice system rather than, as characterized by Professor Hoeffel, a
continuation of trends in Supreme Court decisions that “all but severed any
relationship between a claim of actual innocence and the Constitution.”77
One effective way to deter misconduct by government officials and
remedy rights violations that result from such misconduct is to impose civil
liability on officials through civil litigation processes.78 The use of civil
liability has been especially important for making police officers more
knowledgeable, aware, and worried about their actions that would violate
citizens’ rights.79 Unfortunately, in Connick v. Thompson,80 the Roberts Court
missed an opportunity to apply civil liability principles against prosecutors in a
manner that would have created greater pressure to avoid misconduct that leads
to erroneous convictions.81 In that case, John Thompson was convicted of
robbery and murder and thereafter sentenced to death.82 Prior to gaining his
release because of these erroneous convictions, he spent fourteen of his
eighteen years in prison enduring the isolation of death row and experiencing
the psychological pressure of several execution dates that approached amid the
legal challenges to his convictions.83 Thompson’s erroneous conviction was
caused by prosecutorial misconduct in hiding exculpatory evidence.84
Prosecutors commit a violation of defendants’ constitutional rights when they
fail to share exculpatory evidence with the defense attorney.85 He avoided
execution and gained release solely through the luck of his private investigator
discovering the prosecutorial misconduct shortly before his scheduled
execution.86 As described by one commentator,
[P]rosecutors had failed to turn over evidence that would have cleared him. . . .
This evidence included the fact that the main informant against him had

77. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 43.
78. See GEORGE F. COLE, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & CHRISTINA DEJONG, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 316 (13th ed. 2013).
79. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 59–114 (2009).
80. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
81. As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, “The prosecutorial concealment . . . is bound to
be repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility” for the withholding of exculpatory
evidence. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1355 (majority opinion).
83. Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas writes one of the meanest
Supreme Court decisions ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html.
84. Id.
85. The constitutional requirement that prosecutors reveal exculpatory evidence was
established by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
86. Lithwick, supra note 83.
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received a reward from the victim’s family, that the eyewitness identification
done at the time described someone who looked nothing like him, and that a
blood sample taken from the crime scene did not match Thompson’s blood
87
type.

In addition, “a junior assistant D.A. on the Thompson case, confessed as he lay
dying of cancer that he had withheld the crime lab test results and removed a
blood sample from the evidence room. The prosecutor to whom [he] confessed
said nothing about this for another five years.”88
Thompson gained a new trial as a result of the revelations about the hidden
evidence and he was quickly acquitted by the jury in the second trial.89 He sued
the prosecutor, Connick, for causing the rights violation and unjust lengthy
prison sentence by failing to train the assistant prosecutors about their
responsibilities for revealing exculpatory evidence.90 A jury awarded $14
million to Thompson for the harm that he suffered, but the conservative fivemember majority on the Supreme Court erased the award by declaring that he
could not sue the prosecutor, even though the prosecutor admitted to failing to
train his assistant prosecutors.91 On behalf of the majority, Justice Clarence
Thomas said, among other things, that assistant prosecutors can be presumed to
have learned what they need to know in law school, notwithstanding their
evident ignorance and misconduct in hiding evidence in Thompson’s case.92 In
his effort to maximize the immunity from civil liability enjoyed by
prosecutors, Justice Thomas “willfully ignor[ed] the entire trial record . . . [to]
reduce the entire constitutional question to a single misdeed by a single bad
actor [i.e., one assistant prosecutor].”93 In reality, as Justice Ginsburg presented
in her dissenting opinion, no fewer than five prosecutors were involved in
manipulating the evidence or hiding information in order to convict Thompson
of crimes that he did not commit.94
The traditional principle of immunizing prosecutors from most civil
lawsuits regarding their official actions has value for protecting the
independence of prosecutors’ decision making and sparing them from being
bogged down defending themselves against frivolous lawsuits filed by
vengeful criminal offenders.95 However, granting absolute immunity that

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2011).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).
93. Lithwick, supra note 83.
94. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. Prosecutors have traditionally been among the small categories of decision makers,
including legislators, jurors, judges, and presidents, who enjoy absolute immunity “because their
actions are protected in the interest of public policy, so long as the actions are taken as part of
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includes protection for intentional misconduct that leads an innocent person to
face execution carries the principle too far. It erases the needed pressures and
incentives for prosecutors to follow proper rules and respect individuals’
rights.96 As noted by Professor Susan Bandes, “letting Connick's office off the
hook does violence to the deterrent aims of the statute [creating liability for
constitutional rights violations] and removes any incentive for prosecutors to
institute rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of violating
rights.”97
Prosecutors continue to feel pressures from their superiors98 and from
society99 to make sure that they can make a conviction stick. On the other
hand, however, this pressure to gain convictions may actually create incentives
to violate rules and cover-up rule violations rather than follow the rules of
law.100 Thus, civil liability for prosecutors who commit misconduct could have
significant value as a factor that helps to counteract processes that lead to
erroneous convictions.
B.

Errors From Prior Court Eras

The Roberts Court has the authority to overturn prior Supreme Court
decisions that a majority of contemporary justices conclude were wrongly
decided.101 While certain Supreme Court justices have expressed reluctance
about actively seeking issues that might be reconsidered,102 the Roberts Court

their official duties.” CLAIR A. CRIPE & MICHAEL G. PEARLMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT 312 (2005).
96. As officials who are immune from lawsuits and who have a variety of motives and
pressures in their jobs, prosecutors are susceptible to making decisions and taking actions that
violate both ethics and law. Bennett L. Gershman, Why Prosectors Misbehave, in COURTS AND
JUSTICE: A READER 328 (G. Larry Mays & Peter R. Gregware eds., 2009).
97. Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other
Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 734 (2011).
98. E.g., id. at 730 (“And indeed it is commonplace that obtaining convictions tends to be
the key to prosecutorial advancement.”).
99. See SMITH, supra note 26, at 102 (“Prosecutors’ decisions are normally influenced by
their desire to maintain cooperative relationships with other actors in the criminal justice system
or to preserve a positive image in the eyes of voters and political elites.”).
100. See, e.g., Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of
Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 959 (2011)
(“Prosecutors concerned about job security and promotion, particularly but not exclusively in
jurisdictions where prosecutors are elected, face pressure to increase conviction rates. The
prevalence of a ‘win at all costs’ culture in prosecutorial offices can erode individual prosecutors’
internal sense of norms and ethical behavior.”).
101. CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & DAVID M. O’BRIEN, COURTS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING
308 (2008).
102. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes the
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 233 n.23 (“[M]ore than most Justices he would accept rulings
from which he had dissented as binding precedent.”).
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justices have not been shy about accepting for reconsideration issues that can
lead to the reversal of precedents from prior Court eras.103 The protection of
innocent people from wrongful convictions is supremely important as a matter
of justice, so the Roberts Court should consider every opportunity to clear
away precedents that contribute to wrongful convictions.
One such precedent was produced in the case of Carlisle v. United
States.104 Defendant Charles Carlisle stood trial on a federal marijuana
charge.105 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), Carlisle filed a
motion for a judgment of acquittal following the jury’s return of a guilty
verdict.106 Because the district court granted the motion despite the fact that it
was filed one day past the seven-day time limit detailed in Rule 29(c), the
Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and ordered reinstatement of the
original guilty verdict.107 The appellate court held that an untimely motion for
a judgment of acquittal shall not be granted under the jurisdiction of a district
court.108 Subsequently, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion for the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of the Appeals by enforcing
the statutory filing deadline as a limitation on a trial judge’s authority.109

103. For example, in the middle of oral arguments in Montejo v. Louisana, 556 U.S. 778
(2009), a case concerning police questioning of charged defendants outside of the presence of
counsel, “Justice Alito suddenly made the out-of-the-blue suggestion that the Court should
consider overruling [Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)], despite the fact that this
prospect had not been raised, briefed, or argued by the parties as an issue in the case.”
Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 135 (2010). Ultimately, they reversed the prior precedent. Id. In another
example, during the 2012 Term, the Roberts Court accepted for hearing a challenge to race-based
affirmative action programs in higher education admissions (Fisher v. University of Texas, No.
11-345), which clearly constituted a reconsideration of the Rehnquist Court’s prior decision
endorsing certain practices in the University of Michigan case of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003). Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/us/supreme-court-faces-crucial-cases-innew-session.html? pagewanted=all&gwh=B695CCEBB2A28D41DAB80746DEEF8299. Former
New York Times reporter, Linda Greenhouse, who specialized in covering the Supreme Court,
asserted that, with respect to the University of Texas affirmative action case, “the Supreme
Court’s purely discretionary decision last February to grant review in this case was an aggressive
act of agenda setting. . . . So the logical inference is that the current majority—Justice Samuel A.
Alito Jr. having replaced Justice O’Connor—doesn’t like the precedent.” Linda Greenhouse,
History Lessons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/10/03/history-lessons/.
104. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996).
105. Id. at 418.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 419.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 433.
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The essential flaws and detrimental consequence of the majority’s decision
were made clear in a dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, joined
by Justice Anthony Kennedy.110 As summarized by Stevens, “The majority
nevertheless maintains that the Rule must be read to require judges, in some
instances, to enter judgments of conviction against defendants they know to be
innocent.”111 In establishing this precedent, the majority clearly elevated the
value of adhering to strict procedural rules above the more important value of
ensuring that criminal punishment is reserved for those defendants whose guilt
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.112 Is slavish adherence to a filing
deadline really more important than keeping an innocent person from being
sent to prison? Here the risk of erroneous conviction seemed particularly
undervalued because the procedural violation was especially minor, as the
motion was only one day late in failing to meet a short seven-day deadline.113
Justice Stevens emphasized the inherent power of the federal court:
There is a “power ‘inherent in every court of justice so long as it retains
control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct that which has been
wrongfully done by virtue of its process.’” United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S.,
at 197. Of course, that power does not survive after the court’s jurisdiction of
the subject matter has expired. It is surely sufficient, however, to enable the
judge to refuse to impose sentence on a defendant when the record does not
114
contain evidence of guilt.

Justice Stevens characterized the issue in the case differently than the
articulation advanced in the majority’s analysis:
The question in this case, therefore, is not whether Rule 29 . . . authorizes the
court to grant an untimely motion for a judgment of acquittal; . . . Rather, the
question is whether that Rule withdraws the court’s pre-existing authority to
refrain from entering judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it
115
knows to be legally innocent.”

To Stevens and Kennedy, the statute was silent about this inherent
power,116 and, therefore, the majority relied on an erroneous negative inference
to claim that the statutory filing deadline intended to indicate that judges

110. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 446.
112. See supra notes 25–48 and accompanying text regarding differing values and attitudes
driving decisions concerning wrongful convictions.
113. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 418.
114. Id. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original).
116. See id. at 443 (“Therefore, absent some express indication that Congress intended to
withdraw the power that implicitly attends its initial grant of jurisdiction, a district court acts well
within its discretion when it sets aside a jury verdict and acquits a defendant because the
prosecution failed to prove its case.”).
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lacked power outside of the statute to counteract erroneous jury decisions.117
The Stevens dissent made its point most strongly by referring to trial judges’
authority to prevent a case from going to a jury when a prosecutor has failed to
carry the burden of proof regarding criminal guilt:
It would be most strange to conclude that this [inherent] authority, which
enables a district court to keep a case from the jury altogether when the
Government fails to prove its case, does not permit the same court to revise a
guilty verdict that the jury returns despite the Government’s insufficient
118
proof.

Unfortunately, this case presented the Court with an opportunity to
consider the fate of a man whose guilt was not clearly proven, yet the majority
opinion emphasized the lapsed filing deadline as the defining factor against
granting a motion for acquittal.119 Because this precedent undervalues the
importance of using available mechanisms—including the wisdom and
judgment of experienced judges120—to guard against wrongful convictions, the
Supreme Court should look for an opportunity to revisit and overrule this
precedent.
Another case the Roberts Court should both revisit and overturn is Arizona
v. Youngblood,121 as it also aided in the Court’s contributions to wrongful
convictions. On October 29, 1983, a middle-aged man abducted, kidnapped,
confined, molested, and sodomized a ten-year-old boy after the boy left an
evening church service.122 Sadly, the attack lasted nearly ninety minutes after
which time the young boy was released from captivity.123 The assailant
threatened to kill the boy if the young victim spoke with the police.124
Subsequently, the child returned home and his mother drove him to a hospital
where a sexual assault kit collection procedure was performed for the purpose
of gathering potential evidence, including semen samples, hair, blood, and
saliva.125
After examining the slides containing biological evidence, the crime lab
investigator concluded that a sexual assault occurred, but no further tests were

117. Id. at 421–26 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 442 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 416.
120. Judges typically have expertise with evaluating evidence from past experience as
attorneys as well as experience on the bench while, by contrast, jurors have a single encounter
with the courtroom process and their interactions with other jurors, thereby limiting their abilities
as effective fact-finders and careful determiners of standards of proof. See Saul M. Kassin, The
American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 687 (1990).
121. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
122. Id. at 52.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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carried out that might have helped to either identify or exonerate suspects.126
The boy’s clothing, which contained stains from bodily fluids, was not
refrigerated to prevent the biological materials from degrading.127 Meanwhile,
the victim identified a suspect from a photographic lineup and Larry
Youngblood was placed into police custody.128 When the clothing and other
samples were actually tested more than a year later in order to provide proof
linking the suspect to the evidence, the crime lab scientists were unable to
successfully isolate a blood-type classification or any other factor useful for
identification from the biological material.129 Youngblood claimed that the boy
had made a mistaken identification of him as the assailant, but he was
convicted of the crime.130 He appealed by alleging that proper preservation and
timely testing of the biological evidence would have exonerated him.131 The
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction by finding a violation of due
process.132 The Arizona court stated that “when identity is an issue at trial and
the police permit the destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant
as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due
process.”133
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which stated that
the police were not proven to have acted in “bad faith” while conducting their
investigation, and the police carry no constitutional duty to perform any
particular tests.134 Therefore, the police did not violate the Due Process
Clause.135 However, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Marshall and Brennan, argued that “[t]he Constitution requires that criminal
defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a ‘good faith’ try at a fair
trial.”136 In other words, proof of “bad faith” by the police should not be
required to establish that a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial because,
as was apparently the case for Youngblood, “police ineptitude . . . [can] den[y]
the opportunity to present a full defense” and thereby violate the right to due
process.137
Police should bear the responsibility for preserving evidence in their
possession in order to permit future testing. Fulfillment of this responsibility is

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 53.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54–55.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 54.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
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essential because of the many cases in which scientific testing techniques have
improved over the years so that, for example, convictions based on blood types
have been overturned years later when newly-developed DNA testing
techniques freed wrongly-convicted prisoners through exclusion of individuals
among those who share a blood type.138 In all of these cases, if police had
permitted the destruction, degradation, or loss of biological evidence, whether
done intentionally or negligently, then innocent people would have remained in
prison, including wrongly-convicted individuals serving life sentences.139 A
legal duty to preserve evidence certainly requires the expenditure of scarce law
enforcement resources,140 but to do otherwise would represent the abdication
of a greater responsibility to preserve individual liberty and guard against
wrongful convictions.141
IV. CONCLUSION
The tragic consequences of insufficient emphasis on guarding against
wrongful convictions are easy to see when innocent people serve long prison

138. For examples of exonerations based on scientific testing techniques that were not
available at the time of conviction, see New DNA Testing Frees Convicted Colorado Rapist,
Killer, NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2012, 4:55 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/30/
11466476-new-dna-testing-frees-convicted-colorado-rapist-killer?lite; Molly Hennessey-Fisk,
Texan Wrongly Convicted of Rape Freed after 24 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/25/nation/la-na-nn-rape-texas-exonerated-20120824;
Convicted Texas Man Cleared by DNA Test After 30 Years in Prison, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 4,
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june11/texascase_01-04.html; DNA Tests Free
Convicted Rapist, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_
162-532165.html.
139. See New DNA Testing Frees Convicted Colorado Rapist, Killer, supra note 138.
140. Kevin Johnson, Storage of Evidence Key to Exonerations, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2011,
at 13A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20110328/crimelab
28_st.art.htm.
141. Justice John Paul Stevens described the importance of individual liberty as something
that predated the Constitution and a value that was neither created by nor extinguished by law:
But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty
which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are
limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The
relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen
who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and
enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty,
and surely not the exclusive source.
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty
as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process
Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or
regulations.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sentences.142 Larry Youngblood, the man convicted of rape, whose case was
turned aside by the Supreme Court in 1988, later had a stroke of luck when a
small swab of biological evidence was found and tested using new DNA
techniques in 2001.143 The tests proved that Youngblood was innocent, just as
he had claimed all along.144 If not for the fortunate discovery years later,
Youngblood would have had no hope of gaining exoneration. Other prisoners
who are deprived of opportunities to test evidence cannot count on enjoying
similar luck.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s role in facilitating such injustices
merely creates opportunities for additional people to be affected, such as the
141 cases in Colorado in which a Denver Post investigation found that police
and prosecutors had destroyed evidence that prisoners sought to have tested.145
Included among these cases was one in which police, in violation of their own
department’s policies and a court order to test the evidence, tossed into a
dumpster DNA evidence labeled “DO NOT DESTROY” and thereby
prevented a prisoner from attempting to prove his innocence.146 As nationallyknown criminal defense attorney Abe Hutt said about his client’s case, you
should not have to
scream about your innocence from a [prison] cell for 10 years and finally get
the money together to have this stuff tested only to have so many people at the
police department be careless, negligent, bad faith, reckless, whatever you
want to call it, and thereby destroy forever your ability to prove your
innocence and then have a court look at you and say, well, tough, that’s kind of
147
the way it goes.

Police officials claimed that the evidence was destroyed through
“miscommunication”, so a Colorado judge ruled that they were merely
negligent and not acting in “bad faith.”148 Thus, the possibly-innocent prisoner
continued to languish in prison with his avenue for exoneration eliminated.149
As Professor Peter Neufeld has noted, “[i]n law school, we have been
taught that, absent bad faith, the destruction of critical evidence will not be
deemed prejudicial. As a result, there has been no requirement that law

142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 646 (2001).
144. Id.
145. Susan Greene & Miles Moffeit, Bad faith difficult to prove: Through carelessness or by
design, tiny biological samples holding crucial DNA fingerprints often disappear on authorities’
watch. Innocent people languish in prison, and criminals walk free, DENVER POST, Oct. 1, 2007,
at A01, available at http://www.denverpost.com/evidence/ci_6429277.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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enforcement agencies use due diligence to preserve evidence.”150
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court bears at least partial responsibility for many
injustices resulting from the precedents that it has established that provide
insufficient protection against erroneous convictions. Moreover, as the 300th
innocent person was freed from prison through subsequent DNA testing in
2012151 and hundreds of others were exonerated by other means since 1989,152
evidence accumulates indicating that the problem of wrongful convictions is
more acute than people realized—with error rates for some crimes potentially
as high as fifteen percent.153
The Supreme Court does not bear sole responsibility for guarding against
the risks of wrongful convictions. State legislatures can craft laws that mandate
evidence preservation, opportunities for scientific testing, and reform of
lineups and other procedures that lead to mistaken identifications.154
Prosecutors can proactively facilitate the reexamination of evidence, as
demonstrated by the model program in Dallas, Texas,155 rather than resisting
legitimate efforts to determine if someone was wrongfully convicted.156 Yet,
the Supreme Court plays an important role and it can do more to advance the
accuracy of criminal case outcomes. As indicated by the discussion in this
article, the Roberts Court has made decisions concerning DNA testing and
prosecutorial misconduct that enhance rather than diminish the risk of
wrongful convictions.157 The justices could use their authority to undo the
harm caused by these precedents as well as correct errors in prior precedents
that enhance the risk of wrongful convictions by, for example, needlessly
limiting trial judges’ authority to enter “not guilty” verdicts and failing to
prevent the destruction of testable evidence.158

150. Neufeld, supra note 143, at 646.
151. Douglas A. Blackmon, Louisiana death-row inmate Damon Thibodeaux exonerated with
DNA evidence, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0928/national/35494689_1_dna-evidence-damon-thibodeaux-death-row-inmate.
152. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989-2012: REP. BY THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012), available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_rep
ort.pdf.
153. See Blackmon, supra note 151.
154. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t—Unless It
Also Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 263, 263–64 (2002).
155. See Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of Getting
It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1033, 1037–38 (2011-2012).
156. Shaila Dewan, Prosecutors Block Access to DNA Testing for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2009, at A1, A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/us/18dna.html?page
wanted=all.
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. See supra Part III.B.
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The Supreme Court’s tolerance of legal doctrines that enhance the risk of
error reflects the individual justices’ interpretive approaches, values, and
priorities.159 Thus, progress on the needed refinement of legal doctrines—and
the advancement of justice for wrongly-convicted individuals—will likely
depend on changes in the Supreme Court’s composition. With four
septuagenarians serving on the Roberts Court at the start of its 2012 term,160
compositional changes are likely on the horizon, and the impact of those
changes on doctrinal developments depends largely on the timing of those
changes, the identities of the departing justices, and the orientation of the
president who appoints replacements.161 Ideally, it should not take a change in
the Court’s composition to find majority support for placing a high priority on
preventing erroneous convictions. Unfortunately, however, that is likely the
situation that we face.

159. See supra Part II.A–B.
160. At the start of the Supreme Court’s 2012 Term, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was 79,
Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy were 76, and Justice Stephen Breyer was 74.
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
161. For a description of the individual justices, their approaches to certain criminal justice
issues, and the prospects of change in doctrine through compositional changes in the Supreme
Court, see Smith, supra note 58, at 875–88.

